Career concerns, shareholder monitoring and investment efficiency: From the perspective of compensation contract rigidity in Chinese SOEs  by Wan, Hualin et al.
China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 59–73HO ST E D  BY Contents lists available at ScienceDirectChina Journal of Accounting Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /c jarCareer concerns, shareholder monitoring
and investment eﬃciency: From the perspective
of compensation contract rigidity in Chinese SOEshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2015.01.003
1755-3091/ 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun
University and City University of Hong Kong.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author at: 2800 Wenxiang Road, Songjiang District, Shanghai 201620, PR China. Tel.: +86 21 67705484.
E-mail address: wanhualin@lixin.edu.cn (H. Wan).Hualin Wan a,⇑, Kai Zhu b, Xinyuan Chen c
aLixin Accounting Research Institute/School of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce, China
b Institute of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
c Institute of Accounting and Finance/School of Accountancy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, ChinaA R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 1 February 2013
Accepted 7 January 2015
Available online 7 February 2015
JEL classiﬁcation:
M12
M52
O16
Keywords:
Career concerns
Shareholder monitoring
Investment eﬃciency
Compensation contract rigidity
SOEsA B S T R A C T
This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and share-
holder monitoring aﬀect chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) agency costs. We inves-
tigate investment eﬃciency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and ﬁnd
that there is a signiﬁcant decline in investment eﬃciency prior to CEO retire-
ment, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less signiﬁcant
under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding
of the signiﬁcance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.
 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The debate surrounding China’s retirement system has heated up in recent years, particularly regarding the
issue of whether the country should introduce a ﬂexible retirement system. Some scholars believe that it wouldYat-sen
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rising average life expectancy in China (Li, 2012).1 In addition to this macroeconomic viewpoint, it is impor-
tant to investigate the issues involved from a microeconomic perspective, considering, for example, whether a
more ﬂexible retirement system could alleviate CEOs’ lack of career concern incentives resulting from the
mandatory retirement age, reduce agency costs and maintain or improve the performance of Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). These issues are in urgent need of theoretical and empirical evidence.
In theory, career concern incentives have dual eﬀects. On the one hand, early in CEOs’ careers, such incen-
tives help to mitigate agency costs between CEOs and shareholders (Fama, 1980; Holmstro¨m, 1999). On the
other hand, when CEOs are approaching retirement, a lack of career concern incentives can lead to a horizon
problem for CEOs and increase agency costs, which can be characterized as a decline in investment eﬃciency,
increased private beneﬁts of control gained through insider trading, excessive remuneration and increased per-
quisite consumption. Because investment is an important source of corporate value, a decrease in investment
eﬃciency equates to a loss in value. Thus, a change in investment eﬃciency oﬀers a useful perspective for
examining agency costs immediately before CEOs retire.
Many studies have discussed the rigidity of the compensation contracts awarded to CEOs of Chinese SOEs
and the consequences thereof (Chen et al., 2005; Xin et al., 2007; Wan and Chen, 2012). Here, we analyze how
the lack of career concern incentives inﬂuences investment eﬃciency under the mandatory retirement of SOE
CEOs from the perspective of compensation contract rigidity.2We also investigate whether shareholder super-
vision can serve as a substitute to reduce agency costs and increase investment eﬃciency.
Our theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that investment eﬃciency often declines immediately before
SOE CEOs retire, although that decline becomes insigniﬁcant in the presence of stronger shareholder super-
vision. Empirical analysis of investment eﬃciency as CEOs approach retirement in a sample of 256 publicly
listed SOEs in the 1999–2007 period produces further support for this conclusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the literature in Section 2, discuss the back-
ground to the study and propose hypotheses in Section 3, outline our research design in Section 4 and display
our empirical results and analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
2.1. Managerial labor market and career concerns
Managerial labor market mechanisms include the CEO appointment mechanism, compensation and incen-
tive mechanism, and dismissal and exit mechanism. Prior research shows that although the managerial labor
market for Chinese SOEs is still controlled to a certain extent (Liu, 2001; Chen, 2003), its eﬃciency has grad-
ually improved, as indicated by the marketization of compensation, increased pay-performance sensitivity
(Zhou, 2003; Zhou and Huang, 2006; Lv and Zhao, 2008; Wu and Wu, 2010; Chen and Li, 2011) and a more
eﬃcient appointment and dismissal mechanism (Zhu, 2002; Fang et al., 2007).
In addition, researchers have recently turned their attention to the prescriptive 60-year-old retirement age
for SOE CEOs in China. Although it may seem reasonable, this mandatory retirement age can have adverse
eﬀects on the performance of SOEs. Thus, it needs to be discussed as a critical problem in the SOE reform
process. Previous studies have investigated perquisite consumption immediately before the retirement of
SOE CEOs (Wan and Chen, 2012) and ﬁnd that the imminent retirement of its CEO is associated with lower
SOE performance (Zhang, 2010). However, further research is needed to determine how career concern incen-
tives aﬀect the ﬁnancial decisions of SOEs, particularly with regard to the crucial issue of investment eﬃciency.1 As reported in (Li, 2012), some scholars hold the opinion that as average life expectancy rises in China, raising the retirement age and
introducing a ﬂexible retirement system will provide an ideal solution to the retirement age issue. While other scholars propose that China
should implement a ﬂexible retirement system, but note that the opinions of individuals and employers should be consulted rather than
simply sorting by industries or groups.
2 Career concern incentives include both external labor market incentives, such as the CEO’s positions outside his/her current ﬁrm, and
internal labor market incentives, such as how fast and by what means the CEO can get promoted inside that ﬁrm (Brickley et al., 2006).
Because dismissal or demotion can cause negative incentives, career concern incentives can be viewed as opportunities for CEOs to take
positions outside the company and to be promoted or remain inside the company.
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The eﬀectiveness of an incentive contract and its inﬂuence on CEO behavior are of great interest in the cor-
porate governance literature. Incentive contracts include not only the explicit incentive of compensation, but
also the implicit incentive of career concerns (or the managerial labor market). Fama (1980) believes that a
CEO can realize his/her value through market pricing if the CEO market is eﬃcient, in which case the mar-
ginal utility of explicit incentives must equal that of implicit incentives. Whereas, Holmstro¨m (1999) maintains
that the managerial labor market cannot completely resolve the problem of incentives, as a CEO may work
hard early in his/her career and then become a buck-passer later on. To overcome the shirking problem,
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) propose strengthening pay-performance sensitivity as a CEO ages, particularly
when he/she is approaching retirement, thereby making special arrangements to eliminate opportunistic
behavior in the retirement term. The aforementioned studies view explicit and implicit incentives as substitu-
tive in nature. More importantly, they state that if a compensation contract can be adjusted ﬂexibly, then
CEOs should be oﬀered more explicit incentives late in their careers to guarantee the eﬀectiveness of compen-
sation contracts, mitigate agency costs and sustain or increase ﬁrm value.
A CEO’s incentive contract should take into consideration the eﬀect of his/her current work on both his/her
current and future pay. The former embodies compensation incentives (explicit incentives), whereas the latter
embodies career concern incentives (implicit incentives). In theory, an optimal incentive contract should opti-
mize total incentives and if contracts can be adjusted to various environments, then diﬀerent types of contracts
can apply to diﬀerent contract environments while leading to the same eﬀects. In other words, such optimal
contracts always achieve optimal eﬀects regardless of the circumstances. For instance, Choe (2006) examines
optimal CEO compensation contracts in diﬀerent conditions and ﬁnds that when return on investment (ROI)
is considered, the best contract includes base pay, a severance package and a bonus. When ROI is not factored
in, restricted shares and stock options are alternatives. Both types of contracts achieve the same eﬀects. Hence,
the optimality of an incentive contract is determined by whether it can be ﬂexibly adjusted as inventive circum-
stances or contract factors change.
Most international research in this area assumes the precondition of a mature managerial labor market and
ﬂexible compensation contracts, and thus their results may not apply to China. Chinese researchers realize
that SOEs are bound by compensation regulations, which can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on a CEO’s perquisite
consumption and investment decisions. The rigidity of Chinese SOE incentive contracts also mean that ﬁrms
cannot revise CEO compensation contracts to optimize total incentives in the absence of career concern
incentives.
2.3. Incentive contracts, shareholder monitoring, and investment eﬃciency
Prior research shows that incentive contracts exert a signiﬁcant eﬀect on both investment decisions
(Larcker, 1983; Chen and Clark, 1994) and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Lewellen et al., 1985;
Tehranian et al., 1987). Incentive contracts not only inﬂuence the motivation for and scale of investments,
but also their eﬃciency. In general, a pay-performance-sensitive contract aligns the interests of CEOs and
shareholders, prompting CEOs to make investment decisions that boost ﬁrm value (Morck et al., 1990;
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Bliss and Rosen (2001) ﬁnd that younger CEOs
tend to engage in more M&As, evidence for the important role that implicit incentives play in M&As.
Minnick et al. (2011) show that ﬁrms with higher pay-performance sensitivity experience higher abnormal
returns when announcing an M&A decision and higher subsequent performance. These ﬁndings indicate that
an eﬀective incentive contract, whether explicit or implicit, can motivate M&As and boost M&A eﬃciency.
Research on shareholder monitoring and investment eﬃciency indicates that ﬁnancial constraints on invest-
ment can be inﬂuenced by both ownership structure (Zheng et al., 2001) and the controlling shareholder’s
stockholding (Rao and Wang, 2006). Moreover, if a company’s majority shareholder is stated-owned, exces-
sive investments occur more frequently, whereas a higher tradable stock proportion results in the opposite (Xu
and Zhang, 2009). Dou et al. (2011) ﬁnd that under the condition of joint control by multiple large sharehold-
ers, mutual monitoring can mitigate excessive investment.
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rigidity can aﬀect investment eﬃciency. However, because SOE CEOs have access to implicit compensation in
the form of perquisite consumption and implicit incentives in the form of career concern incentives, contract
rigidity may be compensated for to some extent. Theoretical models show that, of the two means of keeping
the issue of CEOs’ moral hazard under control, the weight given to incentive mechanisms versus supervisory
mechanisms depends on the trade-oﬀ between their costs (Demougin and Fluet, 2001). However, in the
absence of career concern incentives, further theoretical analysis and empirical evidence are needed to deter-
mine whether shareholder monitoring can serve as a substitute in controlling agency costs.
2.4. Current study and its contributions
Our review of the literature suggests that most Western research in this area is largely inapplicable to the
SOE managerial labor market in China, and the characteristics of the compensation incentives discussed
therein and conclusions drawn are thus not generalizable to China. Compensation incentive rigidity is quite
common in China and thus oﬀers a useful perspective and foundation for the study reported herein. Such
rigidity can result in principals’ inability to adjust compensation contracts in a timely fashion in response
to a particular CEO’s conditions. It also means that SOEs are deﬁcient in CEO incentives. Previous research
has paid attention to the economic consequences of compensation rigidity, but is largely silent on career con-
cern incentives, the main type of implicit incentive. Here, we examine changes in investment eﬃciency and the
role that shareholder monitoring plays when SOEs face the dual constraints of compensation contract rigidity
and a lack of career concern incentives as CEOs approach retirement. We are particularly interested in the last
term before retirement, which we call the “retirement term” for short. This paper contributes to the CEO
market and career concern incentives literature by oﬀering a ﬁnancial decision-making perspective.
3. Theoretical analysis and hypotheses
3.1. Career concern incentives and investment eﬃciency under compensation contract rigidity
The foregoing literature review shows that if compensation contracts can be adjusted ﬂexibly, optimal
incentives can in theory be achieved for CEOs regardless of whether they are close to retirement,3 and invest-
ment eﬃciency may not necessarily deteriorate. Our interest here, however, is how career concern incentives
inﬂuence investment eﬃciency under the rigidity of the compensation regulations in place for Chinese SOEs.
On the one hand, an absence of career concern incentives can result in underinvestment. Because the Chi-
nese SOE managerial labor market is regulated, SOE compensation contracts generally lack pay-performance
sensitivity. At the same time, increases in cash compensation are constrained by various kinds of political
power. Therefore, it is quite diﬃcult to make special arrangements for CEOs before their retirement. Further,
equity incentives are usually insuﬃcient and overly related to speciﬁc positions. They are thus unable to suc-
cessfully render future ﬁrm performance endogenous to current CEO pay, and CEOs are unable to enjoy
future compensation arising from current successful investments. The absence of career concern incentives
in conjunction with a lack of alternative explicit contracts, and no motive to collect information on investment
opportunities, can lead CEOs to shirk their responsibilities in their retirement term. SOE underinvestment is
the result.
On the other hand, compensation contract rigidity is more likely to have the opposite eﬀect, namely,
overinvestment, as it can serve as a convenient way to obtain private beneﬁts of control. Wan and Chen
(2012) ﬁnd that SOE CEOs enjoy more perquisite consumption rights before retirement (when there is a lack
of shareholder monitoring), which may be caused by their stronger rent-seeking motive in their retirement
term. Gaining private beneﬁts of control via investment is a more typical form of agency problem than3 For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) investigate the characteristics of optimal incentive contracts when imminent retirement has
resulted in horizon problems and a lack of career concerns in CEOs. They conclude that, as implicit incentives decline when a CEO gets
close to retirement, it is better to strengthen pay-performance sensitivity to reinforce implicit incentives, including stock incentives
(Dechow and Sloan, 1991), or confer more options, thereby increasing pay-R&D sensitivity (Cheng, 2004).
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believe that CEOs who lack equity incentives are more impelled to invest excessively. Hao et al. (2010) survey
a number of papers in this area and conclude that excess investment is quite common in capital investment
decisions because CEOs are motivated to consolidate and expand their beneﬁts of control. As Chinese SOEs
have yet to establish a mature incentive and supervisory mechanism, and lack an eﬀective system of account-
ability, CEOs seldom pay the price for investment failures. Hence, CEOs are driven to gain more private ben-
eﬁts of control, which can lead to abuse of free cash ﬂows and to overinvestment.
Thus, a lack of career concern incentives brings about a lower degree of investment eﬃciency under the
condition of compensation contract rigidity. In theory, post-retirement employment can help to mitigate or
eliminate the horizon problems of CEOs caused by retirement and increase investment eﬃciency. Brickley
et al. (2006) investigate CEOs’ pre-retirement agency costs from the perspective of post-retirement position
incentives (continuing to serve as a director of the current or another company), and consider that such incen-
tives do help to reduce these costs. They ﬁnd that CEOs who exhibit better performance are more likely to be
appointed as directors after retirement. However, this mechanism is uncommon among Chinese SOEs. As the
SOE managerial labor market is far from well-established, CEOs have no opportunities to remain with their
company or work in another after retirement (Wan and Chen, 2012). In addition, the prescriptive retirement
age for SOE CEOs lacks ﬂexibility, which renders it diﬃcult in China to mitigate the agency problem induced
by retirement through post-retirement re-employment plans or ﬂexible retirement plans.
Compared to retirement term CEOs, those who quit their jobs have more career concern incentives. When
these incentives are in place, the reputation mechanism works to some extent regardless of the eﬃciency of the
managerial labor market. Accordingly, a CEO who resigns from his/her position with one company can usu-
ally take up a position with another SOE under the existing SOE executive appointment system. Hence, they
have an opportunity to remain or be promoted within the SOE system,4 and are more likely to reap the ben-
eﬁts (or suﬀer the consequences) of successful (or failed) investments. Such CEOs must thus take into consid-
eration the inﬂuence of current investments on future career prospects, and are more likely to make decisions
in accordance with their company’s investment opportunities, which can in turn increase investment eﬃciency.
The end result is that agency costs may not rise systematically and there may be little reduction in investment
eﬃciency.
To sum up, SOE CEO compensation contracts are not optimal in the run-up to retirement. Both under-
and over-investment decrease investment eﬃciency. But, CEOs who resign from their jobs rather than retire
appear to face a diﬀerent situation.
This discussion leads us to propose Hypothesis 1: When SOE CEOs are approaching retirement, a lack of
career concern incentives and compensation contract rigidity results in a decline in ﬁrms’ investment eﬃciency.
3.2. Shareholder monitoring and investment eﬃciency before CEO retirement
Can shareholder monitoring have a constrictive eﬀect when the approaching retirement of CEOs leads to a
decline in investment eﬃciency? Firth et al. (2002) suggest that Chinese ﬁrms are more reliant on internal than
external control mechanisms to restrict a CEO’s adverse behavior. Theoretically, internal control mechanisms
are achieved primarily through equity restrictions and board supervision. However, an important feature of
the corporate governance landscape in China is a strong controlling shareholder combined with a weak board
(Corporate Governance Evaluation Team within Corporate Governance Research Center of Nankai
University, 2004). Zeng and Chen (2006) show that board independence has almost no inﬂuence on a com-
pany’s agency costs, whereas the nature of the ultimate controller does. This paper is concerned primarily with
the inﬂuence of the controlling shareholder.
Researchers have demonstrated that the ﬁnancial constraints of investment within a company are
aﬀected by its ownership structure (Zheng et al., 2001), that the majority shareholder’s shareholding
has an eﬀect on investment (Rao and Wang, 2006) and that majority state ownership is likely to cause4 A minority of SOE CEOs can go into politics or take positions in private enterprises, which gives them similar career concern incentives
to work in SOEs. However, most will not do so, with only 2% turning to private enterprises (Wan and Chen, 2012). Hence, we do not
consider the inﬂuence of post-retirement employment on investment.
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et al. (2011) ﬁnd excessive investment behavior to be mitigated when ﬁrms are under the control of
multiple large shareholders, if mutual supervision exists among them. Thus, in the case of state-owned
controlling shareholders, equity restrictions help to reduce excessive investment and improve investment
eﬃciency. The CEO of the ﬁrm is assigned by the state-owned controlling shareholder (Group) and thus
there is always a strong internal control feature. If CEOs make ineﬃcient investments before retirement,
the controlling shareholders (Groups) ﬁnd it diﬃcult to engage in eﬀective supervision. As an alternative
mechanism, in the presence of equity restrictions, the other shareholders must be able to eﬀectively
restrain those ineﬃcient investments for their own interests. Conversely, if equity restrictions are lacking,
the other shareholders cannot restrict the large shareholders’ decisions eﬀectively and cannot supervise
CEOs’ investment behavior before retirement, thus resulting in a signiﬁcant decline in investment
eﬃciency.
Accordingly, we propose Hypothesis 2: In the absence of equity restrictions, business investment and
eﬃciency decline signiﬁcantly when SOE CEOs are close to retirement.
4. Research design
4.1. Research design and sample selection
The main issue of interest in the study is whether the investment eﬃciency of SOEs declines signiﬁcantly just
before the retirement of their CEOs.5 The research sample thus comprises “retirement” ﬁrms with a CEO is in
his/her retirement term during the research period,6 and the control sample comprises “severance” ﬁrms with
a CEO that leaves oﬃce but does not retire.7 To ensure the comparability of the research and control samples,
the two sets of ﬁrms are matched by industry and size. Retirement term, pre-retirement term, departure term
and pre-departure term are determined as follows. If a CEO aged 58–61 leaves oﬃce after his/her tenure, he/
she enters the retirement term category, the term before it enters the pre-retirement term category. If no CEOs
are facing retirement, the severance term is chosen, and the term before it is chosen as the pre-severance term.
Both the retirement and severance terms are named as outgoing terms, and both the pre-retirement and pre-
severance terms are named as pre-outgoing terms. The recording of in-oﬃce CEOs begins in 1999. Because the
global ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2008 is likely to have exerted considerable eﬀects on both the investment
level and eﬃciency of SOEs, the sample period ends in 2007.
To ensure the robustness of the conclusions in this paper, ﬁrms with missing values for investments,
growth opportunities, operating cash ﬂow, ﬁrm size and CEO age are excluded from the sample. The
ﬁnal sample consists of panel data from 256 listed SOEs and 1,174 ﬁrm-years. The research sample
comprises 128 companies and 582 ﬁrm-years, and the control sample 128 companies and 592 ﬁrm-years.
The observations for diﬀerent years are relatively balanced. At 75 ﬁrms, 1999 contains the fewest; and at
169 ﬁrms, 2003 contains the most. Industry classiﬁcation is based on the Industry Classiﬁcation
Guidance for Listed Companies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2001. Because
the manufacturing industry includes many listed ﬁrms and there are big diﬀerences between second-level
classiﬁcation companies, manufacturing companies are classiﬁed by their second-level classiﬁcation and
all other industries are classiﬁed according to their ﬁrst-level classiﬁcation. The industry distribution
of the sample is representative, with sample ﬁrms representing 19 of the 22 industries. The machinery,
equipment, and instrumentation industry accounts for the largest number of ﬁrms (240), followed by the
metal and non-metal industries (167) and the petroleum, chemical and plastics industries (133). Other5 Both chairperson and general manager are taken as CEO for our research purpose, so either of them facing retirement in SOEs will be
included in our research sample.
6 Retirees who are over the age of 61 when they left oﬃce are excluded. Because the statutory retirement age is 60, if a CEO/chair
candidate is 57 years old, he/she can remain in position for an additional term, but must retire if he/she is 58 years old. Hence, the
retirement age will be no more than 61 years old. If a CEO does not retire at that age, then the company may be special in some way, and
was thus deemed inappropriate for inclusion in the research sample.
7 A decline in investment eﬃciency caused by outgoing CEOs may also exist in the severance sample, and thus including a control sample
based on outgoing non-retiring CEOs helps to control for the general inﬂuence of outgoing CEOs on investment eﬃciency.
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est observations.
4.2. Model selection and variable measurement
According to the classical investment literature, if a company’s investments and growth opportunities are
positively correlated, its investments are deemed eﬃcient (Tobin, 1969; Hayashi, 1982; Hubbard, 1998).
Durnev et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2006) follow this body of literature in their study of investment eﬃciency.
They measure companies’ growth opportunities with Tobin’s Q and investigate the inﬂuence of share price
information and the sensitivity of share prices on companies’ investment eﬃciency. With reference to these
studies and the models therein, the current study investigates the inﬂuence of incentive rigidity on investment
eﬃciency by examining the eﬀects of CEO retirement on a company’s investments and the sensitivity of its
share prices (Tobin’s Q). Since Fazzari et al. (1988), a large body of empirical research has shown that a com-
pany’s operating cash ﬂow is an important corporate investment decision factor. Accordingly, in this study, we
control for operating cash ﬂow as a possible inﬂuential factor in a ﬁrm’s investment decisions.
In accordance with the previous literature and the needs of the study, we use the following variables. Invi,t,
a proxy for investment, is calculated by “cash outﬂows on the purchase and construction of ﬁxed assets, intan-
gible assets and other long-term assets” plus “net cash ﬂows on the acquisition of subsidiaries or other oper-
ating units,” minus “net cash ﬂows on the disposal of ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term
assets,” minus “net cash ﬂows on the disposal of subsidiaries and other business units,” minus the total
sum of “ﬁxed asset depreciation, the depletion of oil and gas assets and productive biological assets,” “the
amortization of intangible assets,” and “the amortization of long-term unamortized expenses” divided by total
assets. All of the company investments considered are additional investments in long-term assets. As Hao et al.
(2010) point out, ﬁxed assets, intangible assets, equity and R&D investments may be tools that the major
shareholder or CEOs can use to obtain private beneﬁts. The total investment amount contains both ongoing
and additional investments. As ongoing investments are a prerequisite for the maintenance of existing value,
whereas additional investments are the core of future company growth, the latter is the main study object in
this research. RetireFirmi,t represents a ﬁrm in the retirement sample. If the CEO of the sample ﬁrm retires in
the sample period, the variable takes a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Leavei,t represents an outgoing CEO. For
both the retirement and severance samples, if a CEO leaves oﬃce after his/her tenure, the variable takes a
value of 1 and 0 otherwise.
TobinQi,t1 stands for growth opportunities
8 calculated by (market value of tradable shares + Net
assets  the proportion of non-tradable shares + book value of liabilities)/(Net assets + book value of liabil-
ities). The book value of liabilities is the total sum of short-term loans, long-term loans and bonds payable. All
of the data are from the beginning of the year. Cashﬂowi,t1 stands for operating cash ﬂow and is calculated by
“net cash ﬂow from operating activities” divided by the opening amount of total assets. Sizei,t1 stands for
ﬁrm size calculated by the natural logarithm of the opening amount of total assets. Invi,t1 stands for lagged
investment, which is used to control for the inﬂuence of investment stickiness on current period investments.
Levi,t1 is the lagged debt ratio and controls for the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial structure. Finally, Balancei,t1 is the
proportion of the shares held by the second largest shareholder group relative to those held by the largest
group, and is included to control for the inﬂuence of equity restrictions.98 Sales growth is a commonly used proxy variable for measuring investment opportunity. However, in this study, sales growth may be
endogenous to investment (for example, overinvestment by CEOs who are in their retirement term may lead to a higher level of sales
growth), and its use was therefore inappropriate.
9 Theoretically, local GDP, whether a ﬁrm’s external auditor is one of the Big Four or one of China’s Big Ten, and other corporate
governance variables may also aﬀect a ﬁrm’s investments and the eﬃciency of those investments. However, this study does not adopt them
as control variables because local GDP is more likely to reﬂect the local investment level rather than investment eﬃciency. At the same
time, because this study is interested in the diﬀerence between ﬁrms, the diﬀerence between districts is absorbed. External audits and other
corporate governance variables can reﬂect diﬀerences in corporate governance, but lack adequate empirical evidence for the exogenous
nature and eﬀectiveness of governance, particularly when it comes to investment eﬃciency. Here, the focus is on retirement and the
inﬂuence of equity restrictions on investment eﬃciency. The role of corporate governance mechanisms is a potential direction for future
research.
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of the study reported herein is on whether the investment eﬃciency of CEOs in the retirement sample (Retir-
eFirmi,t) is signiﬁcantly lower than that of their counterparts in the severance sample, i.e., whether the sign of
RetireFirmi,t  Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1 is signiﬁcantly negative. For model completeness, the interactions of
these three variables, i.e., RetireFirmi,t  TobinQi,t1, Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1, and RetireFirmi,t  Leavei,t,
are also controlled. The regression model used in this study is as follows.Table
Main
Variab
Invi,t
Leavei
Retire
Balanc
TobinQ
Cashﬂ
Levi,t
Invi,t
Sizei,tInvi;t ¼ aþ b1  TobinQi;t1 þ b2 RetireFirmi;t þ b3  Leavei;t þ b4 RetireFirmi;t  TobinQi;t1 þ b5
 Leavei;t  TobinQi;t1 þ b6 RetireFirmi;t  Leavei;t þ b7 RetireFirmi;t  Leavei;t  TobinQi;t1
þ b8  Balancei;t1 þ b9  Cashflowi;t1 þ b10  Levi;t1 þ b11  Invi;t1 þ b12  Sizei;t1
þ RiIndustryi þ RkiYeari þ Ui;tTo avoid the inﬂuence of industry-year factors on variable measurement, Invi,t, Invi,t1, TobinQi,t1,
Levi,t1, Sizei,t1 and Cashﬂowi,t1 are adjusted by their industry-year medians. In addition, to avoid the inﬂu-
ence of extreme values, all variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All data are obtained from the CSMAR
database, except that data on ultimate controlling shareholders are hand collected.
5. Empirical results and analysis
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation of variables
Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables for the 1,174 ﬁrm-years. It shows that investment to total
assets (Invi,t) has a mean (median) of 3.9% (1.4%) and a standard deviation of 9.2%, which means there are con-
siderable diﬀerences among the investment levels of the sample ﬁrms. The outgoing term subsample (Leavei,-
t = 1) accounts for around 53% of ﬁrm-years and the retirement subsample (RetireFirmi,t = 1) around 50%.
Table 2 indicates that investment is highly positively correlated with growth, operating cash ﬂow, and
lagged investment, with correlation coeﬃcients of 12%, 21% and 45% respectively, and is signiﬁcantly nega-
tively correlated with ﬁnancial leverage (correlation coeﬃcient is 14%), which is consistent with the previous
literature (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; Chen et al., 2006). Leavei,t is negatively correlated with investment (coef-
ﬁcient of 1.5%; insigniﬁcant), which shows that ﬁrm investment increases when a CEO is about to leave oﬃce,
but not to a statistically signiﬁcant extent. RetireFirmi,t is positively related to investment (coeﬃcient is 5%,
signiﬁcant at the 10% level), which means the investment level of the retirement sample is signiﬁcantly higher
than that of the severance sample.
Fig. 1 reveals the inﬂuence of retirement (severance) on investment eﬃciency by comparing eﬃciency in the
retirement (severance) term and pre-retirement (pre-severance) term subsamples. It shows that the investment
eﬃciency of the retirement sample is 23.3% in the pre-retirement term, declining to 7.2% in the retirement
term, for a diﬀerence of 30.5%. In the severance sample, in contrast, investment eﬃciency declines from
17.8% to 15.6%, a diﬀerence of just 2.1%. We can thus infer that CEOs who are close to retirement signiﬁ-
cantly reduce a company’s investment eﬃciency. These results provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 1.1
variables and summary statistics.
les Mean Median Std. 1% percentile 99% percentile
0.039 0.014 0.092 0.081 0.368
,t 0.526 1 0.5 0 1
Firmi,t 0.496 0 0.5 0 1
ei,t1 0.216 0.084 0.263 0.002 0.958
i,t1 1.562 1.408 0.673 0.864 3.746
owi,t1 0.07 0.058 0.151 0.169 0.389
1 0.457 0.448 0.194 0.096 0.888
1 0.073 0.05 0.082 0.041 0.4
1(in 100 millions) 21.333 21.259 0.932 19.342 23.673
Table 2
Pearson and Spearman correlation coeﬃcients.
Invi,t Leavei,t RetireFirmi,t TobinQi,t1 Cashﬂowi,t1 Balancei,t1 Levi,t1 Invi,t1
Leavei,t 0.015
(0.614)
RetireFirmi,t 0.048
* 0.021
(0.099) (0.474)
TobinQi,t1 0.120
*** 0.021 0.028
(<0.01) (0.464) (0.346)
Cashﬂowi,t1 0.211
*** 0.019 0.057** 0.096***
(<0.01) (0.509) (0.050) (<0.01)
Balancei,t1 0.045 0.007 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.077***
(0.122) (0.818) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
Levi,t1 0.144*** 0.033 0.073** 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.033
(<0.01) (0.266) (0.012) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.256)
Invi,t1 0.446
*** 0.021 0.064** 0.036 0.105*** 0.045 0.084***
(<0.01) (0.475) (0.029) (0.224) (<0.01) (0.124) (<0.01)
Sizei,t1 0.019 0.056
* 0.098*** 0.268*** 0.073** 0.071** 0.145*** 0.108***
(0.521) (0.057) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.013) (0.015) (<0.01) (<0.01)
Note: Below the parameter estimates are t-values (already heteroskedasticity-adjusted according to White (1980)).
* The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance: that the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-
tailed test).
** The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance: that the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-
tailed test).
*** The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance: that the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-
tailed test).
-10.0%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
Rerement sample Severance sample
Pre-rerement pre-severance term Rerement severance term
Figure 1. Time-series diﬀerences investment eﬃciency.
H. Wan et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 59–73 675.2. Regression results and analysis: full sample
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 lists the regression results for the retirement and severance samples. The coef-
ﬁcient of TobinQi,t1 is 0.012 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level), which means that the greater the growth opportu-
nities, the more investments there are and the greater the overall investment eﬃciency of the SOE in question.
It also means that increases (decreases) of one standard deviation lead to increases (decreases) of 1% in invest-
ments (Invi,t), which equals a quarter of investment’s mean value (3.9%). The implication is that investment
eﬃciency, which is measured by the sensitivity of investment opportunities, is economically signiﬁcant. The
coeﬃcient of RetireFirmi,t is 0.003, indicating that the retirement sample has an insigniﬁcantly higher invest-
ment level than the severance sample (approximately 7.6% of the mean value). Hence, we can conclude that
there are no big diﬀerences between the retirement and severance samples, thereby excluding the possibility
that the results presented herein are the result of biased sample selection. The coeﬃcient of Leavei,t is
0.001, indicating that the investment level increases slightly for outgoing CEOs, but not to a signiﬁcant extent
either statistically or economically. Hence, outgoing CEOs, in general, do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
Table 3
Regression results for full sample (OLS model).
Dependent variable: Invi,t
(1) Full sample (2) Retirement sample (3) Severance sample
TobinQi,t1 0.012
*** 0.015** 0.013***
(3.30) (2.43) (3.62)
Leavei,t 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.25) (0.23) (0.04)
RetireFirmi,t 0.003
(0.38)
Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1 0.001 0.025*** 0.002
(0.18) (2.94) (0.32)
Leavei,t  RetireFirmi,t 0.006
(0.59)
RetireFirmi,t  TobinQi,t1 0.004
(0.61)
Leavei,t  RetireFirmi,t  TobinQi,t1 0.027**
(2.45)
Balancei,t1 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.90) (0.48) (0.86)
Cashﬂowi,t1 0.132
*** 0.133** 0.133***
(4.01) (2.54) (3.92)
Levi,t1 0.032*** 0.040** 0.023
(2.82) (2.17) (1.62)
Invi,t1 0.446
*** 0.381*** 0.505***
(11.56) (7.26) (9.14)
Sizei,t1 0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.25) (1.41) (0.93)
Observations 1,174 1,174
Adj. R2 24.8% 25.2%
Note: Below the parameter estimates are t-values (already heteroskedasticity-adjusted according to White (1980)).
OLS = ordinary least squares. * The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance, i.e., that the parameter estimates are
signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
** The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance, i.e., that the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(two-tailed test).
*** The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance, i.e., that the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1% level
(two-tailed test).
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which indicates that, compared with former tenure, neither investment level nor investment eﬃciency decrease
signiﬁcantly, thereby precluding the possibility that the study was inﬂuenced by the outgoing CEO factor. The
coeﬃcient of RetireFirmi,t  TobinQi,t1 is only 0.001, which means that an increase (decrease) in investment
level brought by one standard deviation of TobinQi,t1 is 0.1% higher in the retirement sample, an increase too
small to reach statistical signiﬁcance. We can thus conclude that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in invest-
ment eﬃciency between the retirement and severance samples and that the retirement sample does not suﬀer
from sample selection bias. If our prediction that investment eﬃciency declines in the retirement term holds,
then that decline can be taken to result from the lack of incentives arising from the rigidness of compensation
contracts and retirement problems in Chinese SOEs.
The coeﬃcient of the study’s main variable, i.e., RetireFirmi,t  Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1, is 0.027 and sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level, which indicates that, compared with severance companies, retirement companies’
investment eﬃciency decreased signiﬁcantly in the outgoing term of their general managers. Economically,
the investment eﬃciency of the severance companies during their executives’ severance term is the sum of
TobinQi,t1 and Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1, that is, 0.013, and its economic meaning is the same as the coeﬃcient
of TobinQi,t1. The investment eﬃciency of the retirement companies during the retirement term should be the
sum of TobinQi,t1, Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1, and RetireFirmi,t  Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1, that is, 0.012. In
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ments (Invi,t) by 1.1%, which is equal to 28% of investment’s mean value. Investments and investment oppor-
tunities change inversely, and the change is economically signiﬁcant. The implication is that investments
remain eﬃcient during the severance term of companies, but are ineﬃcient during the retirement term of com-
panies. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 present the regression results of the retirement and severance samples sep-
arately. They are consistent with the regression results for the full sample. Moreover, in the separate
regressions, the coeﬃcient of Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1 is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, which further veriﬁes the
credibility of the results presented above. Taken together, our results indicate that a lack of incentives resulting
from the rigidity of compensation contracts and retirement problems leads to decreases in investment eﬃ-
ciency and that these decreases do not arise from the outgoing CEO factor or sample selection bias.
In the regression of the full sample, the coeﬃcient of the control variable Cashﬂowi,t1 is 0.132 (signiﬁcant
at the 1% level), which means a company’s operating cash ﬂow exerts a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on its investment
level. Further, a one standard deviation change in Cashﬂowi,t1 leads to an investment change of 1.3% (which
equals 33% of the mean value), which is signiﬁcant both statistically and economically. The coeﬃcient of
Levi,t1 is 0.032 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level), meaning that more highly leveraged companies are less likely
to invest. A one standard deviation change in Levi,t1 leads to a 2.8% change in investments, which is both
statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of Invi,t1 is 0.446 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level), which
suggests that investments are sticky. A one standard deviation change in Invi,t1 leads to a 3.3% change in
investments, which is signiﬁcant both statistically and economically. The results of the foregoing variables
are the same as those in Chen et al. (2006) and Xin et al. (2007).5.3. Inﬂuence of equity restrictions
Chen and Wang (2004) and Tang et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the second largest shareholder in a ﬁrm can restrict
entrenchment and other opportunistic behavior by the largest shareholder. Based on data of the ten largest
shareholders, Hong and Xue (2008) further deﬁne the ﬁrst and second largest shareholder groups, and inves-
tigate how the second largest shareholder group suppresses the opportunistic behavior of the ﬁrst. Dou et al.
(2011) ﬁnd that, conditional upon a number of large shareholders jointly controlling a ﬁrm, if those sharehold-
ers mutually supervise one another, overinvestment behavior is alleviated. In this paper, we argue that the clo-
ser the proportion of shares held by the second largest shareholder group relative to the largest shareholder,
the greater the former’s power to supervise the latter and the more likely they are to supervise the CEOs
appointed by the latter. Accordingly, to further test Hypothesis 2, we use the proportion of shares held by
the second largest shareholder group to those held by the largest group as a proxy for equity restrictions
(denoted Balancei,t1). To avoid the endogenous eﬀect of outgoing CEOs on investment eﬃciency and equity
restrictions, we use the mean of a company’s pre-outgoing term (denoted Balance_Meani,t1) as the basis for
calculating the median (Balance_Mediani,t1). If Balance_Meani,t1P Balance_Mediani,t1, the company’s
equity restrictions are considered to be strong, and otherwise weak.11
Table 4 presents the results by group. In the low equity restriction group, the coeﬃcient of
RetireFirmi,t  Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1 is 0.043 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level), indicating that, compared with
a severance company, a retirement company’s investment eﬃciency decreases signiﬁcantly in the retirement
term relative to the pre-retirement term. In the high equity restriction group, the coeﬃcient of
RetireFirmi,t  Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1 is 0.011, indicating that compared with the severance sample, invest-
ment eﬃciency in the retirement sample experienced no signiﬁcant decline when CEOs are in their retirement
term rather than the pre-retirement term. The diﬀerence between the foregoing coeﬃcients was 5.4%, and an
F-test shows the diﬀerence to be signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results validate Hypothesis 2, which posits10 Because the variables in the regression model were already median-adjusted, when calculating signiﬁcance (standard deviations of
correspondent coeﬃcients  independent variables), we adopt the standard deviations after median-adjustment rather than those before,
as in Table 1. The standard deviation of Tobin’s Q is 0.91 in the regression sample.
11 As the actual controlling shareholding data in the CSMAR database begin from 2003, we replace data before 2003 with data for 2003.
Although this missing data may have introduced some degree of bias, it is more likely to be “biased against” the results reported in this
paper.
Table 4
Regression results grouped by equity restriction level (OLS model).
Dependent variable: Invi,t
(1) Equity restrictionPmedian (2) Equity restriction < median
TobinQi,t1 0.014
** 0.010***
(2.05) (2.64)
Leavei,t 0.003 0.006
(0.38) (0.72)
RetireFirmi,t 0.002 0.008
(0.27) (0.91)
Leavei,t  TobinQi,t1 0.010 0.012
(1.25) (1.14)
Leavei,t  RetireFirmi,t 0.010 0.017
(0.82) (1.37)
RetireFirmi,t  TobinQi,t1 0.003 0.006
(0.26) (0.64)
Leavei,t  RetireFirmi,t  TobinQi,t1 0.011 0.043***
(0.77) (2.91)
Cashﬂowi,t1 0.138
*** 0.125***
(2.76) (2.92)
Levi,t1 0.039** 0.025*
(2.11) (1.79)
Invi,t1 0.440
*** 0.448***
(8.07) (8.25)
Sizei,t1 0.001 0.001
(0.27) (0.39)
Observations 1,174
Adjusted R-squared 24.9%
Note: Below the parameter estimates and those in parentheses are t-values (heteroskedasticity-adjusted according to White (1980)).
* The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance: that the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-
tailed test).
** The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance: that the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-
tailed test).
*** The parameter estimates indicate the level of statistical signiﬁcance: that the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-
tailed test).
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investment eﬃciency decline arising from incentive contract rigidity cannot be reduced.
In summary, the enforced retirement of SOE CEOs result in incentive contract rigidity, and the loss of con-
tract eﬃciency results in a decline in investment eﬃciency. Further investigation shows the consequences of a
rigid incentive contract to vary by shareholder supervision. When equity restrictions are stronger, the second
largest shareholder groups have relatively stronger power to restrict the largest shareholder, which helps to
strengthen the supervision on CEOs and compensate for a lack of ﬂexibility in retirement term incentive con-
tracts. Accordingly, in this case, there is no signiﬁcant decline in investment eﬃciency. If, in contrast, non-ulti-
mate controllers’ supervisory power is insuﬃcient to make up for the reduced eﬃciency arising from incentive
contract rigidity, the result is a signiﬁcant decline in investment eﬃciency.5.4. Further discussion and sensitivity analysis
If the retirement of CEOs causes a decline in investment eﬃciency, are there any diﬀerences between central
and local SOEs, whose ultimate controllers are the central and local government, respectively? In this paper,
we argue that, on the one hand, the supervision of central SOE shareholders may be stronger because of the
government’s policy to “retain the large, release the small,” thereby alleviating the decline in investment eﬃ-
ciency caused by CEOs’ retirement. On the other hand, because of the monopoly position of central enter-
prises and their greater reliance on administrative means, the market compensation mechanism is more
likely to exist in local SOEs than in central SOEs, thereby leading to greater compensation rigidity in central
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ciency. The answer depends on which inﬂuence dominates. The results presented in this paper primarily sup-
port the latter prediction (although the diﬀerence between central and local SOEs is statistically insigniﬁcant).
In other words, the retirement of CEOs in central SOEs may lead to a decline in investment eﬃciency because
of the salary rigidity in these SOEs.12
The overinvestment model in Richardson (2006), the most commonly used empirical research model at
present, inﬂuences the study reported herein in the following ways. First, the establishment of the optimal
investment level had the preconditions of no information asymmetry or agency problems. However, when esti-
mating additional investments, with the exception of the investment opportunity variables, the variables
caused the estimates of expected investments to deviate from the theoretically optimal investment level.
The estimated optimal investment level includes a return variable. Accordingly, if the market expects enter-
prises with managerial retirement issues to suﬀer more severe agency problems, it will underestimate the the-
oretically optimal investment level, and thus overestimate overinvestment or underestimate underinvestment.
Second, the model includes one-period-lagged investments. Because the outgoing term is related to three con-
secutive years, if overinvestment exists in the ﬁrst year, overinvestments in previous years are taken as the nor-
mal level in estimating overinvestment in subsequent years, thus leading to underestimation of subsequent
years’ overinvestment, which is detrimental to the accuracy of the research results. We use the Tobin’s Q
model in this study to investigate the sensitivity coeﬃcient between investments and investment opportunities,
which is not aﬀected by the aforementioned factors.
To ensure the reliability of our conclusions, we perform the following sensitivity analyses, which result in
no changes to the main conclusions. First, in the measurement of Tobin’s Q, we calculate the market value of
equity by all shares multiplied by the share price, and the market/book value of liabilities including all liabil-
ities rather than just including loans and bonds. Second, we group companies according to power by the pro-
portion of the second largest shareholder groups’ shareholding relative to that of the largest shareholder,
dividing the groups by 20% and 50% rather than by the sample median. Third, we identify the equity structure
by calculating the total shareholding of the second- to ﬁfth-largest shareholder groups divided by the share-
holding of the largest shareholder group. Fourth, in accordance with Milnor and Shapley (1978), we calcu-
lated the Shapley index of diﬀerent largest shareholder groups, and grouped companies according to the
sum of the Shapley index of the second- to tenth-largest shareholder groups divided by that of the largest
shareholder group. Finally, we carried out regressions on outgoing chairpersons and general managers
separately.6. Conclusions
This paper theoretically analyzes how career concerns and shareholder monitoring aﬀect CEO agency costs.
Eﬃcient compensation contracts help to reduce agency costs, but a lack of incentives owing to imminent
retirements cannot be remedied by adjusting compensation contracts because of the constraints imposed by
contract rigidity in the Chinese SOE context. Shareholder monitoring as an internal governance mechanism
helps to alleviate agency costs, particularly when incentives are insuﬃcient, and contract eﬃciency can be
improved to some extent through shareholder monitoring. In Chinese SOEs, compensation contracts suﬀer
rigidity, and the problem of managerial myopia is exacerbated by the retirement-age regulation. Empirical
analysis of these issues is of both theoretical and practical signiﬁcance.
This paper reports the empirical results of systematic examination of the eﬀects of rigid compensation con-
tracts on ﬁrms’ investment eﬃciency based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 1999 to
2007. The results reveal a signiﬁcant decrease in investment eﬃciency in the retirement term of the CEO rel-
ative to the previous term. However, stronger shareholder monitoring can eﬀectively restrict the agency prob-
lems of CEOs approaching retirement, thereby improving investment eﬃciency.
This paper is of theoretical signiﬁcance. In Chinese SOEs, promotion opportunities or the possibility of
staying on constitute important incentives for executives because the private beneﬁts of control arising from12 To save space, this paper does not report the relevant results, but they are available from the authors upon request.
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The incentive contracts in SOEs remain optimal despite compensation regulations. However, promotion
incentives decline as CEOs approach retirement and compensation contract rigidity induces greater agency
costs and diminishes investment eﬃciency in the retirement term. In the presence of compensation contract
rigidity, shareholder monitoring can serve as an eﬀective alternative mechanism.
The paper is also of practical signiﬁcance. One of the most important topics in SOE reform is the demand
to establish and improve incentive and monitoring systems. We currently lack suﬃcient empirical evidence to
determine whether shareholder monitoring can improve contract and investment eﬃciency in the face of com-
pensation contract rigidity, and thus reduce agency costs. The results reported herein show that compensation
contract rigidity increases agency costs, although shareholder monitoring can alleviate these costs, thereby
improving contract eﬃciency and enhancing ﬁrm competitiveness. The debate over the demand for a more
ﬂexible retirement system in Chinese SOEs has become increasingly ﬁerce in recent years and this paper adds
supporting evidence for the requirement for greater ﬂexibility. Implementing a more ﬂexible retirement system
may help to strengthen the eﬃciency of incentive contracts and decrease the agency costs induced by compen-
sation contract rigidity.
Acknowledgments
This paper received support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 70972060,
71102013 and 71272008), National Accounting Leader (Reserve) Personnel Training Plan (Academic Class),
Humanities and Social Science Research Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China (Nos.
11JJD790008, 13YJC790041 and 14JJD630005), Innovation Program of the Shanghai Municipal Education
Commission (Nos. 11ZS186 and 14ZS157) and the “Shu Guang” project supported by the Shanghai Munici-
pal Education Commission and Shanghai Education Development Foundation (No. 10SG54). It is also
included in the “211” Key Project of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. We owe many
thanks to Prof. Bin Ke (Nanyang Technological University) and Prof. Hongjun Zhu (Shanghai University
of Finance and Economics) for their enlightening advice. Nevertheless, we three co-authors take full respon-
sibility for the paper. We also gratefully acknowledge Junzi Zhang (Lancaster University) for her assistance in
data collection and excellent work in general.
References
Bliss, R., Rosen, R., 2001. CEO compensation and bank mergers. J. Financial Econ. 61, 107–138.
Brickley, J.A., Linck, J.S., Coles, J.L., 2006. What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems,
and CEO incentives. J. Financial Econ. 52 (3), 341–377.
Chen, D., 2003. A study and analysis on local government, corporate governance: empirical evidence from subsidy in China. J. Finance
Econ. 29 (9), 15–21 (in Chinese).
Chen, S., Clark, R.L., 1994. Management compensation and payback method in capital budgeting: a path analysis. Acc. Bus. Res. 24 (94),
121–132.
Chen, Z., Li, Y., 2011. Marketization process, characteristics of the enterprise and executive pay-performance sensitivity. Finance Trade
Res. 6, 133–143 (in Chinese).
Chen, X., Wang, H., 2004. Equity restrictions and ﬁrm value: model and empirical evidences. Quant Tech. Econ. 11, 102–110 (in Chinese).
Chen, D., Chen, X., Wan, H., 2005. Regulation and non-pecuniary compensation in Chinese SOEs. Econ. Res. J. 2, 92–101 (in Chinese).
Chen, Q., Goldstein, I., Jiang, W., 2006. Price informativeness and investment sensitivity to stock price. Rev. Financial Stud. 20 (3), 619–
650.
Cheng, S., 2004. R&D expenditures and CEO compensation. Acc. Rev. 79 (2), 305–328.
Choe, C., 2006. Optimal CEO compensation: some equivalence results. J. Labor Econ. 24 (1), 171–201.
Corporate Governance Evaluation Team within Corporate Governance Research Center of Nankai University, 2004. Strong Controlling
Shareholder and Weak Board. China Entrepreneur 3, pp. 126–128. (in Chinese).
Dechow, P., Sloan, R., 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem: an empirical investigation. J. Acc. Econ. 14, 51–89.
Demougin, D., Fluet, C., 2001. Monitoring versus incentives. Eur. Econ. Rev. 45 (9), 1741–1764.
Dou, W., Liu, X., An, L., 2011. Ownership concentration, allocation of control rights and ineﬃcient investment in ﬁrms: monitoring or
colluding among multiple large shareholders? J. Manage. Sci. 11, 81–96 (in Chinese).
Durnev, A., Morck, R., Yeung, B., 2004. Value-enhancing capital budgeting and ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return variation. J. Finance 59 (1), 65–
105.
Fama, E.F., 1980. Agency problem and the theory of the ﬁrm. J. Polit. Econ. 88, 288–307.
H. Wan et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 59–73 73Fang, Y., Xia, L., Zhu, J., 2007. Can management turnover improve ﬁrm performance? Empirical research on corporate governance
eﬃciency of ﬁrms with poor performance. China Acc. Finance Rev. 1, 1–45 (in Chinese).
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, R.G., Petersen, B.C., Blinder, A.S., Poterba, J.M., 1988. Financial Constraints and Corporate Investment.
Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 1988 (1), 141–206.
Firth, M., Fung, P.M.Y., Rui, O.M. 2002. Firm Performance, Governance Structure and Top Management Turnover in Chinese Listed
Firms, Working Paper.
Gibbons, R., Murphy, K.J., 1992. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: theory and evidence. J. Polit. Econ. 100
(3), 468–505.
Hao, Y., Liu, X., Lin, Z., 2010. Snatching private beneﬁt of control with capital investment: comment and discussion. Manage. Rev. 2,
109–120 (in Chinese).
Hayashi, F., 1982. Tobin’s marginal and average Q: a neoclassical interpretation. Econometrica 50 (1), 213–224.
Holmstro¨m, B., 1999. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1), 169–182.
Hong, J., Xue, H., 2008. The eﬀect of equity restrictions on the amount of related party transactions and the consistence of related party
sales. Nankai Bus. Rev. 1, 24–30 (in Chinese).
Hubbard, R.G., 1998. Capital-market imperfections and investment. J. Econ. Lit. 36, 193–225.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the ﬁrm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J. Financial Econ. 32 (3),
305–360.
Jensen, M., Murphy, K., 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. J. Polit. Econ. 98, 225–264.
Larcker, D.F., 1983. The Association between performance plan adoption and corporate and capital investment. J. Acc. Econ. 4, 3–30.
Lewellen, W.G., Loderer, W.D., Rosenfeld, A., 1985. Merger decisions and executive stock ownership. J. Acc. Econ. 4, 209–231.
Li, Y. 2012, June 7. Raising Retirement Age is An Inevitable Choice. Oriental Morning Post A04. (in Chinese).
Liu, X., 2001. China Enterprise Development Report: 1990–2000. Social Science Academic Press, Beijing, China (in Chinese).
Lv, C.J., Zhao, Y., 2008. A Study on the eﬀect of the incentive given to managers of state-owned enterprises. Manage. World 11, 99–109
(in Chinese).
McConnell, J., Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. J. Financial Econ. 27, 595–612.
Milnor, J.W., Shapley, L.S., 1978. Value of large games 2: oceanic games. Math. Oper. Res. 3 (4), 290–307.
Minnick, K., Haluk, U., Liu, Y., 2011. Pay for performance? CEO compensation and acquirer returns in BHCs. Rev. Financial Stud. 24,
439–473.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1990. The Stock Market and Investment: Is The Market a Side-Show?, vol 2. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity.
Rao, Y., Wang, Y., 2006. Large shareholders’ eﬀect on corporate investment: evidence from China listed companies. Nankai Bus. Rev. 5,
67–73 (in Chinese).
Richardson, S., 2006. Over-investment of free cash ﬂow. Rev. Acc. Stud. 11, 159–189.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1989. Management entrenchment: the case of managerial speciﬁc investments. J. Financial Econ. 25 (3), 123–
139.
Tang, Q., Luo, D., Wang, L., 2005. Controlling shareholder’s tunneling and resistant powers: evidence from the Chinese stock market.
China Acc. Rev. 1, 63–86 (in Chinese).
Tehranian, H., Travlos, N., Waegelein, J., 1987. The eﬀect of long-term performance plans on corporate sell-oﬀ-induced abnormal returns.
J. Finance 42, 933–942.
Tobin, J., 1969. A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. J. Money, Credit, Banking 1, 15–29.
Wan, H., Chen, X., 2012. Shareholder monitoring, compensation contract eﬃciency and perquisite consumption: a study on the ‘59-year-
old phenomenon’ of state-owned enterprise managers. China Acc. Finance Rev. 4, 111–174 (bilingual both in Chinese and English).
White, H., 1980. Nonlinear regression on cross section data. Econometrica 48, 721–746.
Wu, Y., Wu, S., 2010. Executive compensation: incentives or self-interest? Evidence from the listed ﬁrms in China. Acc. Res. 11, 40–48 (in
Chinese).
Xin, Q., Lin, B., Wang, Y., 2007. Government control, executive compensation and capital investment. Econ. Res. J. 8, 110–122 (in
Chinese).
Xu, X., Zhang, T., 2009. Corporate governance, free cash ﬂow and ineﬃcient investment in China. J. Finance Econ. 10, 47–58 (in
Chinese).
Zeng, Q., Chen, X., 2006. Which internal governance mechanisms aﬀect equity agency cost – a comparison of governance eﬃciency
between block shareholder and the board of directors. J. Finance Econ. 2, 106–117 (in Chinese).
Zhang, R., 2010. Is There An End-of-The-Game Eﬀect – Evidence from Chinese Stock Markets, Working Paper (in Chinese).
Zheng, J., He, X., Wang, H., 2001. Financial constraints of public company investment: from the perspective of ownership structure. J.
Finance 8, 92–99 (in Chinese).
Zhou, Z., 2003. Empirical research on management compensation of China’s listed companies. Reform 3, 50–57 (in Chinese).
Zhou, J., Huang, D., 2006. Risk and pay-performance sensitivity in managerial compensation: evidence from listed companies in China.
Acc. Res. 4, 44–50 (in Chinese).
Zhu, H., 2002. The Cause and Economic Consequences of Turnover of Top Management: An Empirical Study Based on Firm
Performance. Doctoral Dissertation, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.
